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CHAPTER ONE
Death As Metaphor
Lawrence Kimmel

Oh when I was young and easy under the apple
boughs ... Time held me green and dying, though I
sang in my chains like the sea.
◼ D. Thomas
Think. I think we are in rats’ alley, where the dead
men lost their bones.
◼ T.S. Eliot
I
What remains to be said about the question and problem of
death that has not been repeated a thousand times in the
history of human thought and culture? Philosophers in the
Western tradition have seemingly argued every nuance of the
name, nature, causes, and consequences of death since Plato
first took up the death of Socrates as the funding occasion of
his philosophical life and thinking. Epicurean and Stoic
philosophers subsequently framed the basic arguments that
are still with us, directed to three basic questions concerning
death: What is it? Is it good or bad? Should we fear it?
To the first question, arguments differ with respect to
whether death is referenced as a state, a process, or an
event—which is to say that the concept itself is ambiguous,
so any discursive analysis must first settle the question of
reference. But it may be philosophically important to raise
an additional and prior question about the meaning, hence
nature of death just here: since the meaning of death is not
limited to the domain of reference, inquiry into its nature and
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meaning remains open to the full range of its contextual use
in the shared language and life of human beings.
We are inclined to preference the referentially obvious:
death does occur, and we are likely to experience anxiety
when our own lives are threatened with the prospect of
becoming the subject of its reference. There is an obvious
and objective reference to the state of death as well—the
dead in the morgue, soldiers brought home in the body bags
of war—and, ceteris paribus, we are thankful not to be
among them. However, it is a case in point to note the
contextual extension of referential meaning of death and
dead, for example, in the Irish ballad, “The minstrel boy to
the war is gone/ in the ranks of death you’ll find him…”
(Moore,1859);or again, in the now familiar death-row
declaration that accompanies the short walk to execution,
“Dead Man Walking!” Objective reference in each case is
to the dead still living. One might respond that they are not
literally dead; but surely they are not figuratively dead either.
In brief, the sense of reference requires elaboration.
Death as process is also a common reference in critical
discussion, although as process it is better referenced as
dying; death itself then references the termination of the
process (this is the same grammatical point as saying that
running is a process, winning is not). But in any event the
process is neither simple, nor easy. Arguing in the Phaedo
that philosophy is learning how to die, Socrates
acknowledged this as the same task as learning how to live:
the learning process is critical; it takes time, effort, and
thought—it is the undertaking of a lifetime. The process of
living and dying and their relational meaning is intimately
connected. It is equally true to say either that you are now in
the process of living, and/or in the process of dying (that,
from the moment you are born you are dying, and that until
the moment of death you are living). It makes a considerable
difference, of course, which description fits your disposition
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(as in “half empty/half full”). Confronted with a diagnosis of
“terminal illness” one may choose the description and
comportment “I am dying”; but it is equally a fact and
arguably preferable to choose the alternative expression “I
am living.” The larger point within all of these seemingly
obvious and preferred referential uses is that the concept of
death remains ambiguous.
Answers to the second and third questions common to
critical discussions of death cited above (Is it good or bad? Is
it something we should fear or not?) clearly depend on how
we come to understand the nature and meaning of death.
The procedural point is that the meaning of both life and
death is ambiguous. And if we conceive meaning to be more
critically extensive than that of objective reference, a better
way of addressing the issue of the nature and meaning of
death may be to acknowledge that an understanding of life
and death requires or invites the use of metaphor. This, in
any event, is the direction our discussion will take in the
remarks that follow.
It is obvious, of course, that death can be used as a
metaphor in the description of other things. “Sudden death
overtime” is a familiar mundane sports expression that adds
little to further our understanding of death as a terminus. But
other metaphorical uses are more reflective of the range of
consciousness concerning life and death. Death at an Early
Age for example, is a book written about the educational life
and destiny of the inner-city ghetto child. Think of other
familiar titles that disclose domain and dimensions of
meaning: Death in Venice about spiritual decay; The Naked
and the Dead, about the visceral commonplaces of war. But
more generally, the meaning of both death and life are
themselves embodied in metaphors. We might say of death,
what Wittgenstein remarked about pain: it is not something;
but it is not nothing, either. People do die; in fact, it is in the
nature of all living things that they die, so death is not
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nothing. On the other hand, to say what death is, we must
and do have recourse to metaphor in the narratives of life.
Death is no more a thing than the mind or spirit is a thing,
notwithstanding we change our minds and raise our spirits.
So how are we to proceed?
A basic intuition is that, like any other concept, to
understand the depth and dimensions of the meaning of
death—its nature—we must surround the concept with its
essential and relational expressions in contexts of use. For
example, we can, for specific purposes, referentially fix “the
moment of death”—currently preferred is the diagnostic test
of “brain dead.” But this is only one functional notion of
death, and it is a mistake to think this reference is somehow
definitive or the root of all intelligible discussions of the
nature of death.
It might be useful to distinguish two kinds of reality in this
connection: fictive and factive reality. The boundary
between the two is not always definite or clear. Death is a
terminal condition of life: this is a fact (a truth of factive
reality). But cowards die many times before their death,
while the valiant taste of death but once, which is at the very
least a different kind of fact (what I rather here will call a
truth of fictive reality). There is an obvious philosophical
hurdle—not, I think, dead end—that I will bypass in this
essay. For our purposes it is enough to concede that there
are truths about life disclosed in fictive contexts—often cited
as paradigms are the great soliloquies in the tragic drama of
Shakespeare, not a few having to do with the boundaries of
life and death, some of which we will reference as our
inquiry proceeds. In any event, both factive and fictive
contexts figure significantly in our understanding of the
human condition—the condition under which life is given to
human beings, which includes natality and mortality.
Together, they provide venues of expression for existential
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truths of consciousness in the phenomenology of shared
experience.
II
Man is a creature that knows he is going to die. It is this
fact of human existence that arguably accounts for the depth
of human consciousness and the scope of human culture. In
any event, this situation is a compelling reason to appeal to
literature as a philosophical resource for understanding death
as defining feature of human life.
Plato set a limiting frame for the philosophical discussion
of death in his account of the last days of Socrates, and there
is a serious question whether we have progressed beyond
Socrates’ counsel to his interlocutors at his execution that to
consider death an evil to be feared is presumptive. His
argument is that genuine knowledge of death—of what it is
to die—is not available to us in principle. While Socrates
does go on to claim that death properly understood is a good,
the tenor of his argument is morally persuasive, intended to
remind his friends to discover in themselves the virtue of
courage that life requires. His dying words to Crito—that he
owes a cock to Aesclepius—is a parting metaphor of
acknowledgement that death is part of the process of healing
in and of a good life; that is, death is the making whole of a
complete life well lived.
Apart from the metaphysics of this puzzle, it may be
instructive to note a parallel lesson that physicians have
discovered whose patients are all terminal: where curing is
not possible, there is an alternative of healing. One who
cannot be cured of an illness may still be healed—that is,
made whole in the acceptance of the conditions of her life,
indeed of the conditions of life itself. This has an effect of
shifting the medical paradigm toward a broader conception
of health, and of patient as person. In terms of our present
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interest, it also marks a different conception of the relation of
living and dying. It has been observed by those treating the
terminally ill, that at a certain point, a patient shifts from
deciding to live, to deciding to die. The general point is that
living and dying are of a piece, and that meaning plays a
significant role even in the treatment of illness in the face of
death.
Modern philosophical discussions tend not to draw on
Plato’s metaphysical and moral discussion of death, but
rather on Epicurean and Stoic texts that shift the focus to an
aesthetics of pleasure, and to happiness in life. On this latter
view, death, conceived as annihilation or non-life, tends to
be dismissively treated as irrelevant to positive discourse and
concern. The simple logic of this scheme is both clever and
persuasive on its surface: As I am, death is not; as death is, I
am not. This mantra of dismissal is neat, and perhaps will
suffice if we remain locked into a referential definition of
death as a state or event. But we are haunted in life by the
spectre of death, and the dimensions of its meaning pervade
too much of our lives to accept the simple reassurance of
Epicurean reduction.
The domain of discourse of and about death is broad and
varied in the life of culture, and this seems reason enough to
extend philosophical inquiry and analysis to the full range of
its metaphorical expression. Of particular interest in the
complex phenomena of consciousness is the ineffable, whose
referential meaning is typically a boundary concept (life,
death, absolute, infinite, God). In this and related instances,
indirect discourse and the ordinary and extraordinary
contexts of literature become important resources of
understanding. Poetic expressions typically capture some
image and aspect of common dread and wonder about
death—images of final places, of sleep, of stillness, of
darkness, of silence, of loss, of isolation, of release, of peace,
in which death has currency as a summons, a judgment, a
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journey. The most well known of all literary references for
every school child is probably Hamlet’s soliloquy,
contemplating suicide, in which death is a consummation
devoutly to be wished:
…To die, to sleep;
To sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there's the rub;
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil…
But that the dread of something after death,
The undiscover'd country from whose bourn
No traveller returns, puzzles the will…
◼ Shakespeare (Shakespeare, 1929, Act III)
Drawing back from the sharp edge of decision, Hamlet
remarks on the general feeling that in the presence of death,
“…conscience doth make cowards of us all” (Shakespeare,
1929, Act III). In The Tempest, Shakespeare provides a
different and larger picture, in Prospero’s metaphor of the
world as a stage, and the end of the play of life is a striking
of the set, where not a rack is left behind. The image here of
death is romantically benign, in which our little lives are
rounded with a sleep.
A different but common theme of realism is struck in
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, in the contemptuous
announcement by a servant “Mistah Kurtz—he dead”
(1971). This scathing contempt reflects the crude and brutal
facticity of living to dead. The monstrous figure of Kurtz,
who a short time before had been adored as a god, becomes a
useless and offensive thing that is buried in a muddy hole the
following day. The heart of darkness metaphor in Conrad’s
story has indefinite references—to the savage passion at the
heart of civilized life as well as the primitive depth of the
human soul. But at the heart of these images is a common
idea in life and literature of death as a devouring darkness,
the shroud that awaits the remains of a life, from Macbeth’s
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weary resignation and acceptance of the waiting darkness
“…Out, out brief candle…” (Shakespeare, 1963, Act V) to
Thomas’ rage against the consuming darkness and the dying
of that very light. Whatever awaits, there is a deep and
common resonance in the ominous summons of John
Donne’s “For Whom the bell tolls”: Nunc Lento Sonitu
Dicunt, Morieris - Now, this bell tolling softly for another,
says to me: Thou must die (1972).
The many different images of death in literature bring into
question again the complementary difference between sense
and reference.
Consider the philosophical distinction
between death, and its meaning—what it is / and what it
means. We want to say that a death in the family is real,
whatever the meaning of the concept. Death is final,
whether welcome or terrifying, whether we understand it or
not. That raw fact of our mortality is something that
happens with or without our acceptance. But it is in the
language of addressing even this bare fact that metaphor
arises—that death comes to us, that we give in to it, accede
finally to a recognition that whatever the wages of sin, death
is the wage of life. Whether in the case of an athlete dying
young, the clever lad slips away betimes, or is cut down in
his prime, or another runs the good race of long life and slips
quietly into everlasting rest, there is in every case dominion,
disinvestment and devastation that requires the account of
metaphor.
The reference of inquiry can be broadened by reviewing
some of the familiar contexts and expressions in literature
that inform our understanding of the enigmatic presence of
death in life and human consciousness. If we take the primal
relation of natality and mortality as given: then what?
“Earth to earth, dust to dust…” (Revised English Bible,
1989,3:19) this is the reality; but already in this expression
the reality of death is brought in fuller meaning to
consciousness. The image of grains of sand draining away is
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a familiar reference to time, to life, and to death. The force
of this image attests to the fact that life, in its rudimentary
expression is time; death simply means that time runs out.
The natural life of creatures other than Man is simply life
and death in time—the whole of existence is framed in the
exclusive metaphor of time. Human life, in contrast, is a
convergence of time and place such that the natural
configuration of life and death is transformed. World
literature is full of memorable reference to the brief
transience of place and to the furtive and insecure
impermanence of hopeful moments in life. It would be
difficult to find better or more troubling expressions for the
assimilation of life and death in terms of time and place than
two classic literary indices of Hebraic and Hellenic cultures:
As for man, his days are as grass. As a flower of the
field, so he flourishes. For the wind passes over it,
and it is gone, and the place thereof shall know it no
more.
◼ The Bible (Old Testament, Psalm 103)
As is the life of the leaves, so is that of men. The
wind scatters the leaves to the ground: the vigorous
forest puts forth others, and they grow in the spring
season. Soon one generation of men comes and
another ceases.
◼ Homer (Iliad, Book VI)
Whether lament or simple acknowledgement, death brings
a depth of recognition to the continuing gift of life. That
organic life feeds only on itself, that life comes from death is
a staple imperative of both jungle and garden as well as a
theme of literature. But the human mind seems incapable of
simple acceptance, and fashions instead a tragic culture.
Rilke provides a modern expression of the same issue that
confronted the Psalmist and the Epic poet:
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Who’ll show a child just as he is? Who’ll set him in
his constellation and put the measure of distance in
his hand? Who’ll make the death of a child out of
gray bread growing dark—or leave it there in his
round mouth like the core of a sweet apple?
Murderers are easily understood. But this: to hold
death, the whole of death, so gently even before life’s
begun, and not be mad—that’s beyond description.
(1961)
The conception of the cycle of life and death invites a wide
range of descriptive images. Comparing the graceful
expression of Tennyson’s distanced acceptance with that of
Samuel Beckett’s acute discharge, one may wonder whether
they are speaking of the same creature, the same sense of life
and death. In Tennyson’s expression, the familiar process is
given depth and beauty:
The woods decay; the woods decay and fall; the
vapors weep their burden to the ground. Man comes
and tills the field and lies beneath…and after many a
summer dies the swan.
(1941b, p. 61)
Beckett’s stark description of the same fact, “…they give
birth astride a grave…” (1954, p.58) is brutal in its brevity;
but if it fails in grace of expression, it loses no gravity of
truth in its reference to the human condition.
III
The stoic idea that death is nothing—that while I am, it is
not, and when it is, I am not—reflects a distinctive Western
bias of individuation. When autonomy loosens into selfabsorption, the reductive rule becomes: ‘If it be not so to
me…what care I how it may be?’—whatever does not affect
me is of no consequence. What on this view is precious and
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alone of absolute worth is my own life. Such a view in the
end reduces life and death to the bare contingency of
personal survival; the logic of that reduction can make of
living an avoidance of death, so that survival becomes a
desperate treading to keep one’s head above water. The
moral life and world of human beings embodies more than
self-interest and the logistics of individual survival, however,
and this makes more of death as well.
The basic and prior question in all this is why we continue
to have such a strong philosophical interest in death. The
simple answer, I think, is because we are interested in
understanding the gift of life. As an existential issue, death
prompts more than idle curiosity. But if we concern
ourselves only with the narrow fact of our own life and
death, obsess with the contingency and imperative of mere
survival, we will come to understand little about even our
own individual lives, and nothing at all of the role that death
plays in our collective lives. More simply, philosophical
inquiry reasonably addresses the pair or relatedness of the
concepts life and death. While we don’t necessarily
understand one in terms of the other, it is doubtful we can
understand either exclusive of the other.
In a debunking age of irony, wit is exercised to show that
death, which traditionally has been a fascination and concern
to peasant and poet alike, is a simple if not trivial fact; that
while it may or may not be something to fret about, it is
certainly not worth spilling philosophical ink. In light of the
declinations of Socratic ignorance and Stoic prudence, the
question of death generally has been deferred to relatively
idle speculation in clerical circles and spiritual cults.
However, the issue and theme of death has remained a vital
and imaginative impulse in the creative arts, and our critical
understanding of the idea (word, concept) of death is
indebted and indentured to the world of literature, and to the
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full range and articulation of consciousness that is the field
of literary expression.
Arguing against limiting philosophical analysis to
referential meaning is intended to displace the bias of
individuated consciousness under which the question of
death is dismissed as moot. A broadened notion of
experience and extended domain of consciousness opens the
question of death to a greater field of imaginative inquiry.
Recall, in this connection, Wittgenstein’s remark that what
cannot be said (discursive matters of referential fact) may
still be shown, through other forms of expression. This is not
a particularly modern insight; the idea is central to Plato’s
project and conception of the Dialogues, in his use of
metaphor, myth, and allegory. Even in the dialogue on death
to which we have been referring, Plato does not let the
matter rest with rejecting claims to knowledge, and he
returns again to the question of death at the end of the
Republic in the “Vision of Er.” Rejecting Plato’s idealism
does not diminish the critical insights of metaphor in the
Dialogues.
Plato’s yoking of critical analysis to the literary resource of
dramatic context, narrative story, and imaginative language
remains a philosophical model for understanding the life of
the mind. An additional appeal to broaden the domain of
philosophical analysis to fictive literature is derived from the
nature of human beings as storytelling animals. We live in
and through the stories we tell and share. Our individual and
collective identities are framed within the stories we tell,
whether narratives of history, scriptures of religion, or
theories of science. There is no specifically privileged
meaning, just as there are no clear limits to the meaningful
stories of life and death, in any particular field. Whether or
not great literature has only two themes—love and death—it
is true enough to insist that death is an abiding passion in the
life-world of human beings. This fact, in turn, argues that
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we should resist any impulse to dismiss the importance of
metaphor on the presumption that it confuses the reality of
factual annihilation with the romance of poetic conceit.
We come again and again to the central question of
meaning in philosophical discourse. From the first impulse
of critical philosophy, conceptually and historically, the
interest and task is to say what something is, to address the
thing itself, to discover its nature or essence. In developing a
method of analysis Plato contrasts merely giving an example
with providing a definition of it. Even granting the
informative usefulness of an example, we have still to see
what it is in the example that distinguishes the thing in
question. In providing an exact definition we search for the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the
concept—and so the essence and nature of the thing itself:
“An object is a triangle, if and only if….”
Not all concepts, however, can be given exact definitions,
as Aristotle noted, and we must be satisfied with the
precision allowed within a given form of discourse. It has
seemed to some that the concept death can be given a
definition--definite boundaries of reference, and so we can in
this case have knowledge of the thing itself. Common to
every example of death is that it marks the end of life, which,
in human life can be recorded by the flat reading of an
electro-encephalogram—exact, as well as regrettable—but
surely this doesn’t say much.
It may be helpful to our analysis to return to the closely
related but separate questions of what something is, and what
something means. In the context of inquiry we want to know
what something is, but we want also to understand what it
means. Clearly to know and to understand are connected,
but I want to keep to the distinction for the moment. The
claim that death is nothing results from denying its
possibility as an experience of consciousness; but this
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introduces a basic philosophical puzzle that invariably links
procedural and substantive questions. Every substantive
claim of what something is or is not, carries with it the
procedural questions: how do you know and how could you
find out? Our earlier reference to a parallel instance of the
‘nothing’ of death, in Wittgenstein’s grammatical reminder
that pain is nothing (no thing), does nothing to dispel the fact
that pain is undeniably real: we can and do experience pain.
There are likely medical descriptions and explanations of the
physiology of pain—mechanics and dynamics of sense
receptors, electrical impulse, nerve ends, brain stem
connections—but the pain itself, we want to say, is what we
feel, what we experience. The paradigm of experience—the
reality—is of a different order from that of explanation.
It is a slightly different task but a parallel procedure, for
example, with the concept of mind. The mind is not a thing,
either, in the sense that the brain is a thing. Reference is
objectively clear in one case, not the other. Even so, we do
have minds and use them, we make up and change our
minds; we judge that a person has a good mind, far superior
to that of another person. In this light, a good deal of
philosophical effort is exercised in trying to say what the
mind is—is it a function, or a process, or a structure…?—the
current preference seems to fix its reference on analogy with
computer software. Once again, however, apart from
theoretical constructs of mind, there is an ordinary and
continuing experience that informs our understanding of the
life of the mind. The mind—what it is and what it means—
requires an analysis of the various and variable uses of the
concept in both theory and the language of ordinary
experience.
Is it the same with death as with pain and mind? Can we
say what death is—the thing itself? There are paradigm uses
in each of these cases: If you want to know what pain
is…here, let me hit your thumb with a hammer. If you wish
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to know what mind is…think of a number between one and
ten. And if you want to know what death is…(?) The
unusual thing in this latter case is, as the stoics pointed out,
whatever death is or is not, it is not open to the report of
personal experience, and so the paradigm of meaning must
be one of description or explanation—hence the usual focus
on instruments that record the cessation of brain activity.
Poets on the other hand, like the rest of us, continue to have a
concern and wonderment about the phenomenology as well
as the related phenomena of pain, and mind, and of the
possible if unreportable experience of death.
Whatever form of analysis is used to account for the
phenomenon and phenomena of death—whether the
technical language of physiology, or the poetic language of
tragic drama—the natural language of ordinary and shared
life is the basic resource of every possible description,
explanation and expression.
If we are interested in
understanding the meaning of death—the He and the She of
it all—then the only boundaries to philosophical inquiry are
the linguistic limits of sense, which change with the ebb and
flow of culture, no less than the progressive exactness of
scientific discovery.
What we are trying to understand here, however, is more
than an isolated phenomenon or experience. Our cultural
interest is engaged to understand the relation of life and
death—life in death, death in life, the stuff that pervades
consciousness and frames the boundaries of life and mind.
Figurative language and fictive literature become critical in
providing a contextual ground for inquiry into the drama of
this relationship.
IV
Whether our informed discourse is about identity or
ideology, mind or madness, there is a fund of human
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understanding that draws on many different kinds of
accounts in literature and the arts, no less than the biological,
psychological and social sciences.
In addition to
contributing to the ordinary discourse about our lives,
literature gives expression to the ineffable, and so provides
access to the sense and significance of the extraordinary and
uncanny. Illness, for example, may be clinically catalogued
and medically diagnosed for treatment, but if we want to
understand it, we must somehow get inside the experience
itself. There is a strong current of feeling about certain
illnesses, for example cancer, that regards a diagnosis itself
as a “death sentence.” Susan Sontag, diagnosed with cancer,
in her book Illness as Metaphor examines metaphors
ostensibly used to support the will to resist cancer, in which
she noted that they do both good and harm. Metaphors of
illness as punitive, as a curse, as an embarrassment, may well
add to the devastation of the disease itself, and those
burdened with the disease may be better advised that cancer
is none of those things, that it is “simply, a disease, and
nothing more” (Sontag, 1978). This abridgment may indeed
help to disengage the patient from the crippling effects of
“giving in to the disease” (and in turn enable her to turn over
her body and problem to a physician), but it also leaves aside
the significance of the phenomenon itself, as well as its
extended meaning in the lives and relations of human beings.
What indeed is the reference in the expression “just a
disease”, and what is the metaphorical import of the counsel
to “not give in”? In the case of cancer, even at the biological
level, clinical descriptions have recourse to metaphors of
“invasive” cancer cells, “feeding on” other cells. How much
more is metaphor required in cases that extend diagnosis and
dis/ ease to depression, grief, withdrawal, and anxiety? That
use may involve abuse does not lessen the need for metaphor
in understanding the complexities of human experience.
Reference to death in literature is sometimes ambiguous
and abstract, sometimes particular and visceral. James
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Joyce’s story “The Dead” opens onto a festive affair of the
Misses Morkan’s annual dance, but also onto events and
images of memory and time such that the shadow of death
fully comprehends the living gathered there. Metaphors of
love and death contend in Joyce’s portrait of Ireland as a
country of the dead, in which memories seem more alive
than anything in its present existence; a nation and culture in
which the dead exert leverage over the living. This story in
the Dubliners carries a vague but insistent cultural finality,
only less visceral than a familiar final image in Poe’s
Masque of the Red Death, in which, in the festive ballroom
of a thousand revelers, “…Death holds illimitable dominion
over all” (1924, p. 186). In such literary works, as in life,
death makes its presence felt in the haunting of memory and
culture as well as the ravages of epidemic and disease.
There is no argument in either for a definitive cast of the
human condition, only a reminder of our terms of
engagement.
In very rare cases, we have documents of poetic voices of
the dying, speaking about their own death in terms that draw
each reader into the orbit of that life and death. Ted
Rosenthal died at the age of 34 of leukemia in 1972. The
following are a few lines from his poem “How Could I Not
Be Among You”:
…I live as a man who knows death:
It is not aimed at anyone
But it will come your way
The wind sweeps over everyone
…You will feel so all alone, abandoned,
And you will cry, “No, it cannot be so!”
But nothing will avail you.
It’s a circle in the round.
No wings, backstage, leading act.
A center stage for all of us.
(1973, p.66)
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There is no room here to detail the crystallized pain that
expresses the essence of Rosenthal’s experience of dying. It
is a testimony we may or may not trust, but it opens
sensibility to an acute awareness of a common fate.
Tolstoy’s familiar story, The Death of Ivan Illich, similarly
draws us into the interstices of a mind and spirit caught up in
the painful and eroding detail and gradual realization of
death, trying to discover cognitive and emotional strategies
of accommodation that only make matters worse.
… all the while here is death! Can it really be
death?" Again terror seized him…he tried to drive
this morbid thought away and to replace it by
healthy thoughts. But death, and not the thought
only but the reality itself, seemed to come and
confront him.… He tried to get back into the
former current of thoughts that had once screened
the thought of death from him. But strange to say,
all that had formerly shut off, hidden, and destroyed
his consciousness of death, no longer had that
effect. Ivan Ilych now spent most of his time in
attempting to re-establish that old current.
(1886)
In Tolstoy’s description, the “current of life,” that
conscious if vague awareness that sustains Ivan’s sense of
identity and wellness, is disrupted by the relentless
foreboding of death. Ordinarily the consciousness of life is
automatic and simply accompanies us in our routine
activities; life in its essential phenomenological duality with
death, is not something we think about. The pain that began
for Ivan with a bump against the knob of a door, gradually
becomes an awareness of death that tears away the
thoughtless comfort of the current of life, so that death—the
thought, the reality—pervades consciousness and finally
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nothing will help to reconnect him to the ease of that
sustaining impulse.
V
Despite, or perhaps because of the obvious characteristics
of the certainty and finality of death, there is an endless
discussion of their implications at various levels of analysis.
Hamlet’s parting words “The rest is silence” is understood as
a remark not only about an individual’s life, but about death
itself. The familiar quip that the only things certain in this
life are death and taxes, serves to align the unwanted,
inevitable, and invasive intrusions of god and government in
our lives. Particularly interesting is the metaphorical
reminder that death is the exacting tax levied on life. If death
is inevitable and mortality is given as a condition of life, then
it would seem natural as well as reasonable simply to accept
it, to integrate this fact into the story of our lives in such a
way that there is unanimity to life and death. Major theories
of culture and human development suggest, on the contrary,
that the whole history of human activity is to be understood
as a reaction against the finality and certainty of death. This
suggests further that natural and rational responses to death
may be at odds. Natural life is simply at one with living and
dying; but life and death which form a unity at an organic
level in lower forms of animal life become separated into
conflicting opposites at the human level.
In philosophical psychology as well as the philosophy of
history, theorists have argued that the response of human
beings to mortality defines the very structure of
consciousness and the purposive activity of culture. Freud’s
familiar claim that the goal of all life is death—that the
ultimate logic of biological homeostasis in human
consciousness is embodied in a death instinct (Thanatos)—
has a parallel construction in Hegelian dialectics. In Hegel’s
account, man is a unique species which has a history—an
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animal whose essence is a function of dialectical
development in time. At a biological level organisms have
no history because living and dying are one; the defining
activity of human culture can be understood in contrast as
life against death, as attempts to contest death. In separating
the natural unity of life and death, cultural history becomes a
response to the conceived alienation of death.
Comportment toward death, whether individual or cultural,
must still contend with the organic fact of mortality, of
course. But the fact embodies a question mark: what is to be
made of the fact? Hegel, in The Science of Logic, cryptically
remarks that the nature of finite things as such is to have the
seed of passing away as their essential being, that the hour of
their birth is the hour of their death. Dylan Thomas gives a
lyrical expression to this very experience in Fern Hill, which
we cited at the beginning of this essay—that even while I am
young and easy in the mercy of his means Time holds me,
green and dying. The same equation of life and death is
expressed in the familiar metaphor that Time is the fire in
which we burn. The bifurcation of life and death sets the
relation as one of conflict, and taxes the living with
resistance and opposition. It was this opposition and
conflict, of course, that was the presenting problem of Stoic
and Epicurean strategies of resolution; but a simpler
alternative is to accept the natural unity of life and death
reconciled to species life.
The essential role that death plays in the development of
culture reflects the peculiar nature of the human creature.
Miguel Unamuno has suggested that a concern for the dead
sets man apart from all other animals; that we go to such
lengths to protect and store up the dead from an elemental
dread of annihilation. The conception of death as alien is
arguably a factor in accounting for the activity of culture as a
flight from death in the studied construction of a stable
environment and permanent community, which in turn make
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possible an enduring memory: a creative cultural frame of
history and immortality. If the essence of human being is
discovered in desire no less than reason, then, once again, an
understanding of death in human life must reach the deeper
soundings of art and literature.
The literature of death comprehends several genres in
resonance with spiritual life and religious ritual. Along with
tragic and elegiac literature, which focus on death and the
dead, there are celebrations of death in the ordinary mass,
and the requiem, in the Kaddish, at wakes, and memorials of
every description. World literature traces a broad spectrum
of the shadow culture of human imagination from classical
accounts, in Homer’s epic of mass slaughter and the burning
of Ilium and the journey of Odysseus to Hades, (where he
discovers that one can speak only individually with the
dead), to the public orations of death in Perikles’
commemoration of the Peloponnesian war dead. Poetic
expression varies from elegy to dirge; Tennyson’s poignant
lament for his friend in the long poem In Memoriam, that
“Death has made his darkness beautiful with thee” (1941,
p.356) is characteristic of mourning in response to grief. The
persistence unto death of Antigone’s determination to bury
her brother against the prohibition of the state, speaks as well
to the rule of war in every age to retrieve the dead. The
Walkuries riding out to claim the heroic dead fallen on the
field of battle is a familiar figure in art that testifies to the
ubiquitous presence of death that accompanies human
aspiration.
What does this extension of inquiry into the fictive
contexts and expressions of death contribute to the
substantive and procedural insights of traditional
philosophy? Most importantly, the idea that the phenomenon
of death is a pervasive feature embodied in every aspect of
human understanding and concern, and that it is a mistake to
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insist on a reductive analysis that would fix the boundaries of
meaning to an objective and literal reference.
Death can indeed be many things—and by this I mean that
it means many things to human beings individually and
collectively. Does it stalk the lonely, and come like a thief in
the night? Sometimes; but Emily Dickenson’s expression
“Because I could not stop for death, he kindly stopped for
me…” (1960, p. 350) suggests a different aspect of death,
courteous in its manner of address. John Keats, who lived
not long enough, and who admitted at times to be half in love
with easeful death, wrote of a longing ‘to cease upon the
midnight with no pain’ (l993, p. 106).
The seductiveness of death is a familiar theme, quite apart
from Freud’s assimilation of Thanatos into the dynamic of
human life. Toward the end of Sylvia Plath’s
autobiographical novel, a passage begins: “I knew just how I
would do it”; (1996) in retrospect of Plath’s own suicide, this
situation takes on an acute pain of disclosure about the
appeal of ending one’s life, shutting out the pain, the worry,
expectations, demands, anxiety, the whole bother of world
and other. In this simple narrative, the character waits until
she is alone in the house, puts on a nice dress, writes a note
that she is going out for a while, climbs on a chair to get her
mother’s pills hidden in a box high in the closet, puts on a
raincoat, goes down into the cellar and into a crawlspace
under the porch, pulls a log in after to conceal her presence.
This is how it ends:
Cobwebs touched my face with the softness
of moths. Wrapping my black coat round me like
my own sweet shadow, I unscrewed the bottle of
pills and started taking them swiftly, between gulps
of water, one by one by one.
At first nothing happened, but as I approached the
bottom of the bottle, red and blue lights began to
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flash before my eyes. The bottle slid from my
fingers and I lay down. The silence drew off,
baring the pebbles and shells and all the tatty
wreckage of my life. Then, at the rim of vision, it
gathered itself, and in one sweeping tide, rushed me
to sleep.
(Plath, 1996)
However alien death may seem, our recognition of its
presence in the life of this young woman makes clear its
intimate relation to ordinary consciousness. If we are to
understand the reach of its shadow into the light of our
continuance, we must come to see death through the eyes of
a poet writing about her own life, and more generally
through the words of poets who search out the sounds of its
variegated expression in life and literature.
The task of philosophy is not to solve the riddle of death,
or put an end to the question of what death is by a definitive
answer to its own question. Rather, the task before us, here
as elsewhere, is to open up the range of intelligible discourse
to the full meaning of its expression.
Marlowe’s familiar soliloquy on life and death in Conrad’s
The Heart of Darkness, is perhaps where we can leave off
(as well as take up) the matter. Marlowe refers to his own
near death on a remote jungle river in the heart of the Dark
Continent that had stripped away the conceits of civilized
European culture. Remembering the gnawing presence in his
mind, he later reflects on the experience:
Droll thing life is—that mysterious arrangement of
merciless logic for a futile purpose. The most you
can hope from it is some knowledge of yourself—
that comes too late—a crop of unextinguishable
regrets. I have wrestled with death. It is the most
unexciting contest you can imagine. It takes place
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in an impalpable grayness, with nothing underfoot,
with nothing around, without spectators, without
clamor, without glory, without the great desire of
victory, without the great fear of defeat, in a sickly
atmosphere of tepid scepticism, without much
belief in your own right, and still less in that of
your adversary. If such is the form of ultimate
wisdom, then life is a greater riddle than some of us
think it to be. I was within a hair’s breadth of the
last opportunity for pronouncement, and I found
with humiliation that probably I would have
nothing to say.
(1971)
Perhaps the most important philosophical insight, coming
full circle, is to acknowledge the obvious: the riddle of life
and death remains after everything else has been said.
Shakespeare’s conclusive remark in Hamlet that the rest is
silence is not the last word, even for him. In passage after
passage in the corpus of his work he investigates the depth of
the question and experience of death, and offers a fictive
world of imaginative space for investigation. Whether man
is a poor player that frets and struts his hour upon the stage
and then is heard no more, or whether at the end of our
revels we are spirits and are melted into air; whether we are
such stuff as dreams are made of and like the fabric of the
vision before us we dissolve and leave not a rack behind,
literature embodies a rich store of metaphor in the narratives
of life unto death that invites philosophical interest and
analysis.
Wittgenstein’s limiting rule in the Tractatus for rational
discourse may be appropriate to review, in closing. His
dictum that “of what we cannot speak, we must remain
silent” (1974, #7) has appealed strongly to the literal biases
of empirical science. But the rule itself refers only to the
objective domain of factive discourse, or more narrowly to
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propositional claims appropriate to science. As
Wittgenstein’s later work makes clear, a good deal remains
to be said about the silence itself, and all that remains in the
fullness of meaning within the life world of experience.
If indeed, the rest is silence, it is, for purposes of
philosophical inquiry, a very full and meaningful silence,
and we should continue to pursue the ghost threads of insight
into death wherever they lead.
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